SPHINCS + , an updated version of SPHINCS, is a postquantum hash-based signature scheme submitted to the NIST postquantum cryptography standardization project. To evaluate its performance, SPHINCS + gives the theoretical number of function calls and the actual runtime of a reference implementation. We show that the theoretical number of function calls for SPHINCS + verification is inconsistent with the runtime and then present the correct number of function calls.
Introduction
Digital signatures are a cryptographic primitive for verifying the authenticity of digital messages or documents. Currently popular signature schemes (e.g., RSA, DSA, ECDSA) mainly rely on one of three hard mathematical problems: the integer factorization problem, the discrete logarithm problem, or the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. However, these problems can be solved and thus signature schemes based on the problems can be broken in a polynomial time with quantum computers running Shor's algorithm [1] .
Post-quantum cryptography research to design signature schemes secure against attacks with quantum computers is mostly focused on four approaches: lattice-based signature, multivariate signature, code-based signature, and hash-based signature. Every signature scheme first reduces the input message by using a hash function. Hash-based signature schemes are built on the minimal assumption that the underlying hash functions are secure. All other approaches require further assumptions on the difficulty of hard mathematical problems.
Lamport proposed the first hash-based signature scheme where each key can be used to sign a single message [2] . Merkle Lamport signature scheme into many-time signatures [3] . In 2015, the first practical stateless hash-based signature scheme SPHINCS was presented [4] . SPHINCS has a hyper-tree structure combining Goldreich's binary certification tree [5, §6.4.2] and HORS (Hash to Obtain Random Subset) [6] . In 2017, SPHINCS + [7] , a revised version of SPHINCS, was submitted to the NIST post-quantum cryptography standardization project. SPHINCS + employs improved techniques such as multi-target attack protection [8] , tree-less WOTS + (Winternitz One-Time Signature) public key compression [9] , FORS (Forest Of Random Subsets), and verifiable index selection. SPHINCS + is the only hashbased signature scheme moving on to the second round of the NIST post-quantum cryptography standardization [10] . SPHINCS + provides three instantiations of hash functions (SHAKE256, SHA-256, Haraka) and six parameter sets (128s, 128f, 192s, 192f, 256s, 256f) where 's' stands for "small" and 'f' for "fast" [7] . In 2019, a revised version of SPHINCS + was released, where a tweakable hash function can be instantiated in two different ways: SPHINCS + -robust and SPHINCS + -simple [11] . For example, SPHINCS + -SHAKE256-128s-robust uses the hash function SHAKE256, the parameter set 128s, and the robust instantiation of the tweakable function. Theoretically, the speed of SPHINCS + can be estimated by counting the number of hash function calls. However, we show that there is a significant discrepancy between the theoretical number of function calls and the actual runtime, i.e., the previous analysis of function calls for the verification operation is incorrect. We present the correct number of function calls for SPHINCS + verification, which is consistent with the runtime.
SPHINCS +
In this section, we briefly review SPHINCS + . Hereinafter, we will refer to the 2019 version of SPHINCS + [11] that supersedes the 2017 version of SPHINCS + [7] . The overall structure of SPHINCS + is a hyper-tree of height h that consists of d layers of XMSS (eXtended Merkle Signature Scheme) trees where each leaf of XMSS is the public key of a WOTS + key pair. Each layer has height h/d. The top layer (i.e., layer d − 1) consists of a single XMSS tree whose 2 h/d leaves (i.e., WOTS + keys) authenticate 2 h/d XMSS trees on the next layer. Layer d − 2 has 2 h/d XMSS trees and, in general, layer i has 2 ( and each WOTS + key of the 2 h leaves signs a FORS public key, which is then used to sign the message. Therefore, SPHINCS + signs a message with one of the 2 h FORS keys. Essentially, the public key of SPHINCS + is the root of the hyper-tree and the private key is a secret seed value that can generate all WOTS + and FORS keys pseudorandomly. Figure 1 shows the structure of SPHINCS + signature. To generate a signature on a message, a pseudorandom index is chosen that determines which one of the 2 h FORS keys is used. The index also determines the path from the root of the hyper-tree to the chosen FORS key. A SPHINCS + signature consists of a FORS signature and d XMSS signatures where each XMSS signature is made up of a WOTS + signature and its authentication path.
Tweakable Hash Functions
Let B be the set of bytes. SPHINCS + uses several instantiations of tweakable hash functions of the form
mapping an ℓn-byte message M to an n-byte hash value md using an n-byte public seed PK.seed and a 32-byte address ADRS. Hash functions F and H are two special cases of T ℓ .
SPHINCS + uses a pseudorandom function PRF for pseudorandom key generation.
To compress the message to be signed, SPHINCS + uses an additional keyed hash function H msg that can process arbitrary length messages. 
FORS
FORS consists of k trees of height a. The leaves of each tree are the hashes of the t = 2 a private key elements. The public key is the tweakable hash of the concatenation of all the root nodes. Figure 2 shows the structure of FORS.
A FORS key pair can be used to sign ka bit message digests. The digest is first split into k strings of length a bits. Each split string is interpreted as an integer in [0, 2 a − 1] and the i-th string is used to select the private key element of the i-th tree. The signature also contains the associated authentication paths for all the selected private key elements, which means one path of length a per tree. Verification uses the signature to reconstruct the root nodes and compresses them using the tweakable hash T k .
XMSS
XMSS is based on the Merkle signature scheme. It authenticates 2 h/d WOTS + public keys using a binary tree of height h/d. Each node in the binary tree is an n-byte value which is the tweakable hash of the concatenation of its two child nodes. The leaves are the WOTS + public keys. An XMSS signature consists of a WOTS + signature and the authentication path for the leaf associated with the used WOTS + key pair.
A WOTS + key pair defines a structure that consists of len hash chains of length w. The WOTS + private key is a length len array of n-byte strings. Each of the len strings in the private key defines the start node for one hash chain. The WOTS + public key is the tweakable hash of the end nodes of these hash chains. A WOTS + signature is a length len array of n-byte strings. The WOTS + signature is generated by mapping a message to len integers between 0 and w − 1. Each of the base-w integer is used to select a node from a different hash chain. The signature is formed by concatenating the selected nodes. In order to verify a WOTS + signature, a WOTS + public key value is computed from the signature. This can be done by completing the chain computations starting from the signature values, using the base-w integers derived from the message.
Previous Performance Analysis
SPHINCS + provides a table that shows the number of func- Table 2 for SPHINCS + verification (y-axis: function calls). Table 2 is given in Fig. 3 .
To check the validity of the analysis, we compare the number of function calls with the actual runtime. Table 3 reproduces the runtime benchmarks for SPHINCS + -SHAKE256-robust verification [11, §10.1] and Fig. 4 is the graph of Table 3 . One can see that the theoretical analysis ( Fig. 3 ) and the real performance ( Fig. 4) are very inconsistent.
In practice, each function call in Table 1 can invoke SHAKE256 more than once. For a message M with l bits, 
If we simply assume that each function call invokes SHAKE256 twice, the runtime of a single SHAKE256 invocation in SPHINCS + -SHAKE256-128s-robust is roughly 11, 129, 628 2×659,902 ≃ 8. In other words, the previous analysis implies that one invocation of SHAKE256 takes only 8 CPU cycles, which is impossibly too fast. † Therefore, we can conclude that the previous analysis of Table 1 overestimates the number of function calls. Remark 1. In parameter set, 'f' means fast signing operation (but slow verification). For example, the signature generation of 128f is faster than that of 128s. However, the verification of 128f is slower than that of 128s.
Remark 2.
For brevity, we focus on the case of SPHINCS + -SHAKE256-robust. Our discussion holds for all other instantiations and parameter sets.
New Performance Analysis of SPHINCS + verification
For SPHINCS + verification, we need to verify one FORS signature and d XMSS signatures. We count the number of function calls for FORS and XMSS separately.
FORS:
FORS consists of k trees of height a. A FORS signature includes a private key element and its associated authentication path for each of the k trees. For each tree, the verification requires one call to F (to obtain the leaf value from the private key element) and a calls † To hash 64 bytes, SHAKE256 takes roughly from 962 (≃ 15.03 × 64) cycles in i7-7800X to 1359 (≃ 21.23 × 64) cycles in i7-4600U [12] . Note that the runtime benchmarks for SPHINCS + -SHAKE256 were executed in Intel Core i7-4770K [11, §10]. which is also shown in Table 4 . Note that PRF is not required for SPHINCS + verification. The numerical values for six parameter sets can be calculated as Table 5 and its graph is given in Fig. 5 .
One can see that our theoretical analysis ( Fig. 5 ) and the real performance ( Fig. 4) are consistent. Moreover, the runtime of a single SHAKE256 invocation in SPHINCS + -SHAKE256-128s-robust is now approximately 11, 129, 628 2×4,712 ≃ 1, 181 CPU cycles, which seems to be a reasonable estimation.
Conclusion
SPHINCS + is a state-of-the-art post-quantum hash-based signature scheme. As SPHINCS + provides various choices of parameter sets and hash functions, the performance estimation is very important for making a proper choice. We hope that our corrected analysis can help users select an appropriate parameter set of SPHINCS + .
